ACTIVITY

PERFORMANCE MEASURES

Purpose 1—National Security: Protect Australia and Australians from national security and criminal threats through effective national coordination, emergency management and policy development.

Note: Items bolded are measures and targets within the Department of Home Affairs 2019–20 PBS.

* indicates a new metric for 2019–20

^ indicates a refined metric for 2019–20

# indicates an existing metric

ACTIVITY 1.1

Effective national coordination and development of national security and transnational, serious and organised crime policies, legislation and programs.

MEASURE 1.1.1

Effective Transport security regulation, policy coordination and advice will prevent and protect Australia from security incidents effecting the movement of people and goods.

PERFORMANCE METRIC

RESULTS

1.1.1.1: Deliver transport security reforms within agreed timeframes to strengthen key regulatory settings *

This metric was met.

In 2019–20, the Department strengthened a number of key regulatory settings in both aviation and maritime sectors within agreed timeframes.

Examples of the Department’s key activities in 2019–20:

• The Department engaged extensively with the air cargo industry to ensure new requirements for domestic air cargo examination were implemented on schedule despite the COVID-19 pandemic.
• Legislative reforms to strengthen the training and education requirements for screening and examination officers at airports, seaports and air cargo facilities were introduced into the Senate in December 2019. The Transport Security (Testing and Training) Bill 2019 was subsequently reviewed by the Senate Scrutiny of Bills Committee and the Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee. Both Committees recommended the Bill be passed with minor amendments. The Minister for Home Affairs approved the minor amendments to the Bill in February 2020. It is anticipated that the amended Bill will be debated during the spring 2020 sittings.
• The Department is currently implementing a range of measures to strengthen the aviation and maritime security identification card (ASIC and MSIC) schemes through the Transport Security Amendment (Serious Crime) Bill 2019. The Bill was introduced into Parliament in October 2019 and reviewed by the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee who recommended that the Bill be passed. The Bill is due to be debated during the spring 2020 sittings.
• The Aviation Transport Security (Landside Security) Amendment Regulations 2019 and the Aviation Transport Security (Security Controlled Airports) Amendment Regulations 2019 were made in November and December 2019 respectively. The Landside Security amendments came into effect in December 2019. The Security Controlled Airports amendments have passed in the Senate and will commence by instrument in December 2020. The amendments aim to reduce regulatory burden on air operators commensurate with risk and will improve aviation transport security, including through mitigating threats in crowded spaces.

The Department continues to work closely with Government and industry to ensure that reforms are delivered within agreed timeframes. The Department is also committed to ensuring that its regulation of the aviation and maritime security sector remains fit-for-purpose and does not impose unnecessary burden on stakeholders, through its extensive consultation on relevant regulatory reforms.

1.1.1.2: 100 per cent of scheduled entities subject to a risk-based compliance assessment meet their statutory obligations or prioritised compliance activity is commenced *

This metric was met.

In 2019–20, 100 per cent of scheduled entities subject to a risk-based compliance assessment were found to have met their statutory obligations, or a prioritised compliance activity was commenced.

The Department completed 1546 compliance activities under the 2019–20 National Compliance Plan (NCP). 282 compliance activities resulted in the issuing of findings notices, equating to 18 per cent of activities conducted. This is consistent with the 1547 compliance activities completed in 2018–19 which resulted in 273 finding notices.

In 2019–20, the Department conducted 466 additional targeted activities to address specific intelligence, investigate a vulnerability or address emerging threats. These targeted activities included:

• 47 activities for the management of complex non-compliances and corrective action plans
• 70 compliance follow-up activities in response to security incidents
• 39 additional inspections and system tests on individual industry participants as a result of compliance history results.

The Department’s annual program of compliance activities, including additional targeted activities to address non-compliance, continues to strengthen Australia’s transport security and reduces the likelihood and potential impacts of future security incidents on the Australian community.

NCP activities assess Australia’s domestic and international aviation and maritime transport industries’ compliance with transport security legislation designed to prevent unlawful interference with transport systems. They provide Government with an understanding of the state of aviation and maritime transport security, inform further compliance and/or enforcement action, and support policy development.

1.1.1.3: Transport security in key regional partners is improved through delivery of the Capacity Building Plan #

This metric was partially met.

In 2019–20, the Department delivered 69 per cent (29 of the scheduled 42) capacity building activities across Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. Six alternate procurement activities were delivered in place of the 13 activities that were cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic, compared to 34 activities delivered in 2018–19.

Examples of the Department’s key activities in 2019–20:

The Identity Security Forum, held in Jakarta, was designed to strengthen identity security and transport sector background checking arrangements in Indonesia. Senior Indonesian and Australian Government officials discussed identity security and the risk of trusted insiders with respect to aviation/maritime security identity cards. It was delivered by the Department, in collaboration with the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO).

A pilot Airport Risk Assessment Course was developed by personnel from the Philippine Office for Transportation Security with mentoring from Departmental representatives in Manila. The course consolidated learning from earlier risk management, risk assessment, course development and instructor training provided by the Australian Government. The workshop will eventually be rolled out to other airports to enable them to develop and implement risk-based aviation security measures tailored to fit their airport’s context and security environment.

The Suspicious Activity Program (SAP) – Train the Trainer Program developed a training module, communications materials and a risk-based implementation plan to be included in the existing Airports of Thailand (AOT) security awareness training program. The implementation plan is being considered by the AOT as a potential model to be implemented across all AOT owned airports.

1.1.1.4: Deliver 100 per cent of compliance activities within the National Compliance Plan (NCP) #

This metric was met.

During 2019–20, the Department delivered 1546 core NCP compliance activities across all industry segments, which equates to 100 per cent of the total allocated NCP activities for the financial year, in comparison to the 1547 compliance activities that were conducted in 2018–19.

In addition to the scheduled NCP activities, aviation and maritime security inspectors conducted 466 targeted activities against regulated industry participants. Where required, NCP and targeted activities were delivered remotely to ensure social distancing requirements were maintained.

1.1.1.5: Australia receives a compliance score of at least 95 per cent at each five-year International Civil Aviation Organization aviation (ICAO) security audit #

This metric was met.

There was no International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) aviation security audit scheduled for Australia in 2019–20. However, the Department continued to progress work to ensure a score of at least 95 per cent is achieved at the next audit.

During 2019–20, the Department actively engaged in the development and amendment of ICAO Annex 17 Standards and Recommended Practices and its supporting guidance material. This included participating in a number of ICAO working groups during 2019–20.

MEASURE 1.1.2

Effective policy implementation and coordination deters foreign actors who wish to harm Australia’s sovereignty, values and national interests.

PERFORMANCE METRIC

RESULTS

1.1.2.1: Develop baseline for number of referrals for information on Counter Foreign Interference (CFI) related matters received from stakeholders *

This metric was met.

In 2019, the Department established, and is maintaining, a record of referrals or requests for information from internal and external stakeholders Since the establishment of the CFI referral program in March 2019, the National Security Hotline (NSH) has recorded 2170 references to foreign interference-related terms in National Security Hotline reporting.¹ During 2019–20, the Department established a baseline of 1937 references, with the number of references throughout 2019–20 increasing each quarter. The increase in foreign interference-related references can be attributed to awareness raising activities undertaken by the Department. Call rates are likely to increase further throughout 2020–21 as awareness of the program continues to expand.

The Department received requests for information from a range of internal and external stakeholders relating to foreign interference, including state and territory governments and the university sector. Requests were particularly focused on the National Counter Foreign Interference Strategy (CFI Strategy), and included requests for information on due diligence tools to support universities embed the Guidelines to Counter Foreign Interference in the Australian university sector.

1.1.2.2: Enhanced domestic coordination and international cooperation of CFI efforts *

This metric was met.

In 2019–20, the Department conducted over 20 CFI-related engagements with both our domestic and international stakeholders These CFI awareness raising and partnership building activities are a key component in Australia’s CFI Strategy. They support efforts in protecting the integrity of Australia’s sovereignty, values and national interests, and in developing stronger international partnerships to counter foreign interference.

Internationally, the Department has adapted its engagement format with stakeholders during the COVID-19 pandemic and continued to undertake international engagements. This has included through teleconferences and videoconferences. The Department will continue to adjust its approach as required during 2020–21.

1.1.2.3: Demonstrated progress against key initiatives within the CFI Strategy *

This metric was met.

Since the December 2019 announcement of the CFI Taskforce Government have invested additional funding totalling to $126.6 million to support CFI initiatives. In 2019–20, the Department continued to support ongoing progress on key initiatives within the CFI Strategy, despite the challenges of COVID-19.

During 2019–20, the Department placed Australia at the forefront of global efforts to deal with foreign interference. The Department’s efforts to date have been successful in hardening the Australian environment to acts of foreign interference.

Examples of the Department’s key activities in 2019–20:

• The Department engaged extensively across multiple sectors to implement the CFI Strategy. This included continuing to support increased resilience in the university sector and supporting the further development of electoral integrity-related matters.
• The Department raised awareness among partner agencies of foreign interference and the threat it poses, both domestically and internationally.
• Key findings from the evaluation of the CFI Strategy continued to be built on to address all known at-risk sectors and provide a practical basis for undertaking engagement and raising awareness.
• Early outcomes were achieved through changed behaviours in those sectors where the Department has concentrated its engagement efforts. For example, some diaspora communities are becoming more willing to engage with CFI efforts.

1.1.2.4: Deliver 10 CFI education programs to key stakeholders *

This metric was met.

In 2019–20, the Department undertook 17 awareness-raising engagements with relevant sector groups against a target of 10.

In December 2019, the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) evaluated the effectiveness of the CFI Strategy, including the Department’s engagement with stakeholders, awareness-raising and the delivery of education and capacity building programs.

The AIC noted the Department had effectively engaged industry, and the overall sentiment identified a positive consensus amongst stakeholders that the Department’s engagement and awareness-raising was effective and pragmatic.

The evaluation noted the benefit of the Department’s role in being a coordination point and conduit between government, intelligence agencies and industry sectors such as universities. In particular, the AIC noted the Department’s ability to reduce the classification of materials for wider consumption and reference case studies played a vital and effective role in shifting perceptions and understanding of CFI across industry sectors. The Department’s awareness-raising efforts with universities, through the University Foreign Interference Taskforce, was highlighted as particularly extensive and effective. Generally, the stakeholders consulted for the evaluation believed awareness-raising efforts was contributing to increased awareness and capacity-building in relation to CFI.

MEASURE 1.1.3

Effective policy development, coordination and industry regulation safeguards Australia’s critical infrastructure against sabotage, espionage and coercion.

PERFORMANCE METRIC

RESULTS

1.1.3.1: Engage with 100 per cent of entities on the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 register in relation to security and resilience ^

This metric was met.

In 2019–20, the Department engaged with 100 per cent of the 167 entities on the Register of Critical Infrastructure Assets (the Register). These engagements included:

• bilateral general advisory meetings with 40 entities
• meetings with 15 entities regarding relevant Foreign Investment Review Board conditions
• engagement with 38 entities to support their compliance with the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018
• participation in the November 2019 Resilience Expert Advisory Group workshop with 20 entities
• call centre engagements with 53 entities
• an advisory email to all entities in June 2020 regarding the Prime Minister’s announcement of sustained targeting of Australian governments and companies, including critical infrastructure, by a sophisticate state-based actor.

The Department engages with entities to clarify details in submissions, or request for further information to the submitted to the Register to meet obligations. Departmental engagement supports information sharing and a shared approach to managing national security risks and increasing resilience.

Engagement in response to 2019–20 bushfires and the COVID-19 pandemic:

To support the Australian Government’s response to the 2019–20 bushfires and COVID-19, the Department established a community of interest with critical infrastructure owners and operators through the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) and held regular teleconferences to coordinate information requests, share information and provide effective cross sector engagement.

The Department also facilitated industry participation in the weekly Crisis Coordination Centre telephone briefings. This allows for two-way emergency management communication with industry stakeholders in the event of a crisis. These meetings proved to be valuable, with an average 90 participants per call.

1.1.3.2: 100 per cent of notifications received under the Telecommunications Sector Security (TSS) reforms to the Telecommunications Act 1997 are responded to within statutory timeframes *

This metric was met.

In 2019–20, 100 per cent of notifications received under the Telecommunications Sector Security (TSS) reforms were assessed within statutory timeframes (30 calendar days for notifications and 60 calendar days for notification exemption requests).

During 2019–20, the Department:

• answered 31 enquiries about the TSS reforms, in comparison to the 37 answered in 2018–19
• received 32 notifications under subsection 314A (in comparison to the 34 received in 2018–19
• received zero exemption applications under subsection 314A(5A) for an exemption from the notification obligation, in comparison to one in
  2018–19.

In instances where the Department did not require further information about a notified change, the average number of days taken to respond was 27 calendar days.

In instances where the Department required further information (14 of 32 notifications) about a notified change, the average number of days taken to request further information was 24 calendar days. The average number of days taken to respond once further information was provided to the Department was 25 calendar days.

1.1.3.3: 100 per cent of Foreign Investment Review Board cases referred are responded to within agreed timeframes ^

This metric was not met.

The outcome of the Department’s national security risk assessments, including any conditions recommended to mitigate identified risks, are provided to the Treasury and contribute to the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) decision-making process. Time required to complete national security risk assessments varies depending on the complexity of risk involved in an application. The standard response timeframe is 10 business days, unless otherwise agreed with the Treasury.

In 2019–20, the Department received 640 FIRB applications from the Treasury, an increase from 403 received in 2018–19. The significant increase in the volume of applications concerning Australian critical infrastructure illustrates the importance of the Department’s role in considering national security risks within the FIRB process.

Of the 640 FIRB applications received during 2019–20:

• 16 were withdrawn
• 49 were still undergoing assessment at the end of the reporting period.

Of the remaining 575 applications:

• 506 (88 per cent) were finalised and responded to Treasury within the agreed timeframe

• 52 were responded to within one week after the agreed timeframe
• 17 were responded to more than one week after the agreed timeframe.

Additionally 39 applications from 2018–19 were also considered during
2019–20. 37 of these were responded to (27 within required timeframes), one was withdrawn and one was still open as at 30 June 2020 (the application was withdrawn post 30 June 2020).

Including the 2018–19 cases, overall performance against the metric during 2019–20 was 87 per cent, with 533 of the 614 responded to within agreed timeframes.

Cases may exceed the benchmark timeframe (10 days) for a range of reasons, including complexity and resourcing limitations. Current procedures require case officers to seek a new agreed timeframe where the timeframe is not able to be met.

MEASURE 1.1.4

Effectively monitor and disrupt transnational, serious and organised crime to protect and preserve Australia’s community and our partners.

PERFORMANCE METRIC

RESULTS

1.1.4.1: 100 per cent of capability plans outlining compliance with telecommunication interception obligations are reviewed within statutory timeframes^

This metric was partially met.

In 2019–20, the Department processed 256 Interception Capability Plans (ICP). Of these, all but one ICP were responded to within the statutory 60 day timeframe, which equates to 99.6 per cent.

In addition, there were 52 applications for Interception Capability Exemptions processed in 2019–20.

The Department ensured that, as far as possible, applications were processed and responded to within legislated timeframes, despite impacts to business arrangements arising from COVID-19.

1.1.4.2: The Department implements policy and legislative reforms in line with Government priorities to enhance responses to national security and law enforcement issues ^

This metric was met.

In 2019–20, the Department continued to implement policy and legislative reforms to enhance responses to national security and law enforcement issues.

Examples of the Department’s key activities in 2019–20:

Assistance and Access Act

The Department continued with the implementation of the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 (Assistance and Access Act) in line with Government priorities. This included providing submissions to and attending hearings for the reviews of the legislation by the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security.

During 2019–20, Australian law enforcement and security agencies have continued to use the powers introduced by the Assistance and Access Act, including technical industry assistance powers and computer access warrants. This includes seeking assistance for the investigation of organised crime, cybercrime and serious crimes against the person, and for purposes relating to national security.

ASIO’s powers

In 2019–20, the Department has continued to progress legislative reforms to ensure ASIO’s questioning, and questioning and detention, warrant powers in response to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security’s 2018 inquiry. The reforms will also provide ASIO with the ability to internally authorise the use of tracking devices in defined circumstances. These reforms were introduced into Parliament in May 2020.

Combatting child abuse

In 2019–20, the Department:

• leveraged the WePROTECT Global Summit to Tackle Online Child Sexual Exploitation to call on digital industry to strengthen efforts to combat online child sexual abuse and maintain lawful access to data
• worked with Five Country counterparts and the digital industry to finalise the Voluntary Principles to Counter Online Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, which were launched by Ministers in March 2020. The Five Countries have partnered with the WePROTECT Global Alliance to promote the Principles globally and drive collective industry action. The Department continued to regularly engage with its Five Country counterparts to maintain pressure on digital industry (including the Technology Coalition) to proactively endorse and implement the Principles. Locally, several Australian tech companies and NGOs have publicly endorsed the Principles
• led national efforts to finalise and endorse the National Standards for Working With Children Checks, culminating in a ministerial announcement in December 2019
• continued to lead a National Working Group comprising states and territories to explore the evidence for a National Public Register of Child Sex Offenders, developing options for ministerial consideration
• released Guidance on the Commonwealth offences for failing to protect a child from sexual abuse and failing to report a child sexual abuse offence to support the new Commonwealth child protection offences under the Combatting Child Sexual Exploitation Legislation Amendment Act 2019 that came into effect in March 2020

1.1.4.3: The Department implements policy and legislative reforms in line with Government priorities to respond to current and emerging money laundering and terrorism financing threats *

This metric was met.

In 2019–20, the Department continued to implement policies and legislative reforms to respond to money laundering and terrorism financing threats.

Examples of the Department’s key activities in 2019–20:

• In August 2019, the Proceeds of Crime Regulations 2019 commenced. These Regulations replaced, and improved upon, the Proceeds of Crime Regulations 2002. The Regulations grant law enforcement enhanced confiscation powers in cases of firearm trafficking, identity crime and non-compliance with Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission orders. This ensures that the proceeds of crime regime is appropriately targeted at the profit-motivated offending that underpins the criminal business model. These powers can already be exercised for people smuggling, human trafficking, child sexual abuse, organised crime, drug, terrorism and money laundering offences.
• In October 2019, the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2019 (the Bill) was introduced into Parliament. The Bill introduces the next phase of the Government’s reforms bolstering Australia’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing framework, and implements policies to respond to current and emerging money laundering and terrorism financing threats. This includes expanding the circumstances in which global financial institutions will be able to share financial intelligence. This recognises the globalised threat that financial institutions face, where criminal organisations will move their funds across borders in search of weak links in the international financial system.

1.1.4.4: Enhance partner governments’ capability through providing capacity building resources *

This metric was met.

In 2019–20, the Department delivered aid-funded technical assistance in the Asia-Pacific region supporting compliance with the international standards on anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism financing (CTF) set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). This contributed to improved regional governance, stability and resilience to transnational organised crime and illicit financial flows.

Examples of the Department’s key activities in 2019–20:

• The Department provided assistance to Papua New Guinea to prepare for the upcoming evaluation of its AML/CTF systems. This included support to identify and rectify deficiencies in its legislation and the effective implementation of these laws, and to identify and progress priority areas for legal and policy reform, including to its AML/CTF preventative measures, asset management, investigative powers and international cooperation frameworks.
• Assistance to Vanuatu was continued to strengthen its international cooperation framework. This included the development of manuals on the effective application of its mutual legal assistance (MLA) and extradition laws, including hosting a multi-agency workshop to address complex money laundering. The workshop focused on the predicate crime of foreign tax evasion and supporting building a more effective AML/CTF system.
• The Department assisted Cambodia to establish its legal framework for MLA and agreement to develop proliferation financing legislation, and provided ongoing support to implement its new laws.
• A typologies report and guidebook on complex money laundering for investigators and prosecutors was completed in conjunction with Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission.

Examples of the Department’s multilateral activities in 2019–20:

The Department co-delivered (with Mongolia) a workshop on concealing the beneficial ownership of proceeds of crime, for delegates to the Asset Recovery Interagency Network – Asia Pacific.

A networking breakfast was co-hosted with the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) for female delegates to the APG Annual Meeting. This expanded the Women Against Money Laundering (WAML) network to approximately 50 women representing over 20 jurisdictions.

The Department participated in the 2019 Joint Training Program for Prosecutors hosted by Indonesia and provided expertise on Australia’s experience with regulating cryptocurrency, proceeds of crime and non-conviction-based asset recovery.

Development of a training package commenced in partnership with APG, as part of the APG Human Trafficking and People Smuggling Project (Phase 2). The training package will support greater cooperation between financial intelligence units, law enforcement, and private/public partnerships.

1.1.4.5: Improve domestic law enforcement coordination through convening cross-jurisdictional fora *

This metric was met.

In 2019–20, the Department continued to engage with cross-jurisdictional fora to progress improvements to domestic law enforcement coordination in monitoring and disrupting transnational, serious and organised crime (TSOC). The Australian TSOC Committee (ATSOCC) contributes to the protection of Australia, its people and its interests from the harms of TSOC through facilitating the implementation of the National Strategy to Fight TSOC (the National Strategy). New Zealand has also joined the ATSOCC.

The ATSOCC met on several occasions throughout 2019–20 to agree on a range of priorities, including the National Counter-TSOC Capability Project which is aimed at strengthening the way that Australia’s counter-TSOC agencies work together to prevent, disrupt and respond to TSOC. The Committee also met to discuss the National Strategic Priorities (NSPs) for countering TSOC and a national TSOC narrative.

The Commonwealth TSOC Centre partnered with the Australian Cyber Security Centre to progress the Capability Project looking at national cyber capabilities to counter-TSOC and cybercrime.

In June 2020, ATSOCC held a video conference to consider the Cyber Wave Interim Report, which outlines preliminary findings from the first wave of the National Counter-TSOC Capability Project. Members noted the Report provides valuable insights for capability uplift and efficiencies to fight TSOC and cybercrime both within jurisdictions and collectively at a national level and committed to work with the Project team in finalising the Report by November 2020.

The Committee’s TSOC narrative and National Strategic Priorities projects have been paused due to COVID-19 and will recommence when capacity allows.

1.1.4.6: Progress in implementing the National Strategy to Fight Transnational, Serious and Organised Crime *

This metric was met.

In 2019–20, the ATSOCC continued to contribute to the protection of Australia, its people and its interests from the harms of TSOC through facilitating the implementation of the National Strategy to Fight TSOC.

In particular, the Department led phase one of the Counter-TSOC Capability Project, the Cyber Wave, on behalf of the ATSOCC. The Cyber Wave involves mapping national cyber capabilities. The Cyber Wave project was paused in March 2020 due to COVID-19. An interim report identifying preliminary insights and opportunities for strengthening national cyber capabilities was delivered to the ATSOCC for consideration in May 2020 and discussed at the June 2020 ATSOCC meeting.

The Department continued to focus on leading responses to illicit drugs, which are a primary source of income and power for TSOC.

Examples of the Department’s key activities in 2019–20:

• The Department coordinated whole of Portfolio strategic responses to illicit drugs, including through the Portfolio’s Illicit Drug Action Plan, launched in November 2019 by the Minister for Home Affairs.
• The Commonwealth Illicit Drugs Joint Agency Taskforce’s Board of Management was convened twice during 2019 to strengthen coordination between law enforcement and health responses to illicit drugs to achieve maximum impact for Australians. The meeting scheduled for early 2020 was cancelled due to COVID-19.
• The Department led whole of Commonwealth strategic communications on illicit drugs. The Taskforce’s website received 2369 page views between launch (November 2019) and 30 June 2020. During 2019–20 the Taskforce published eight social media posts in total reaching more than 177,000 people.
• The Department is working collaboratively with domestic and international partners to counter illicit drugs and other transnational crimes. For example, in March 2020, officers from the Department and the ABF attended the 63^rd Session of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, underscoring Australia's commitment to the international drug control framework and working with global partners to achieve a balanced health and law enforcement approach to drug challenges.

MEASURE 1.1.5

Effective cyber security strategies, policies, and advice protect and advance Australia’s interests.

PERFORMANCE METRIC

RESULTS

1.1.5.1: Enhance domestic coordination and international cooperation in responding to cyber security threats ^

This metric was met.

In 2019–20, the Department continued to regularly engage with a wide range of domestic and international stakeholders regarding cyber security threats to enhance Australia’s national security.

Examples of the Department’s key activities in 2019–20:

• The Department continued to lead international engagement with Five Eyes partners through the Ottawa 5 Cyber Security Policy Forum. For example, Australia hosted the meeting of the Ottawa 5 in November 2019. Outcomes included the security of critical technologies and responding to malicious cyber activity. In 2019–2020, the Ottawa 5 continued to provide a valuable opportunity for international partners to share information on the effects of COVID-19 on the cyber security landscape.
• The Department co-chaired the Cyber Policy Working Group under the annual Australia-France Strategic Dialogue on National Security meeting in France. The Working Group agreed to further engagement between the Department and the French Cybersecurity Agency on mutually beneficial cyber security policy priorities such as the protection of critical infrastructure.
• In partnership with the Australian Cyber Security Centre and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department worked to coordinate responses to cyber security incidents. For example, the Prime Minister’s statement in June 2020 on malicious cyber activity against Australian networks, and the Australian Cyber Security Centre alert on Copy-paste compromises.
• The Department coordinated domestic national responses to cyber security, including through the National Cyber Security Committee which includes the Commonwealth, states and territories.
• The Department led capability development on cyber security responses, including through a specific ‘cyber wave’ which benchmarked national responses to cyber security for national law enforcement and justice-related agencies.

1.1.5.2: The Department coordinates and provides, timely and forward leaning cyber security policy advice to support responses to national cyber security crises *

This metric was met.

In 2019–20, the Department continued to provide timely and forward leaning cyber security policy advice to support responses to national cyber security significant incidents. This included the coordination of timely cross agency advice to support national responses to significant national cyber security incidents in cooperation with the Australian Cyber Security Centre and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The Department continued to progress work to support responses to national cyber security crises and reduce the threat and likelihood of Australia and Australians being targeted in acts of cyber-crime.

1.1.5.3: Demonstrated progress against key initiatives within the Cyber Security Strategy *

This metric was met.

The Department completed the delivery of all initiatives under the 2016 Cyber Security Strategy in 2019–20. As of 30 June 2020, the Department was on track to publish and commence implementing the Cyber Security Strategy 2020, which will succeed the 2016 Strategy.

A key milestone of 2019–20 was the release of the discussion paper Australia's 2020 Cyber Security Strategy: A call for views in September 2019 to inform development of Australia’s Cyber Security Strategy, with 215 submissions received. Following the release of the discussion paper, the Department conducted public consultation sessions in every capital city to engage with industry and the public in the first phase of the Strategy Engagement Roadshow. A second round of consultation was held in January 2020. In 2019–20, the Department met face to face with 1400 stakeholders and over 2.5 million stakeholders were reached by digital media. The Department also assisted (in a Secretariat capacity) the Industry Advisory Panel to draft its final Report. The Panel met 13 times during 2019–20, supported by advice from the Department.

1.1.5.4: A new National Plan to Combat Cyber Crime is developed with support from states and territories *

This metric was partially met.

In 2019–20, the Department continued to engage with all states and territories through mechanisms such as attendance at the ANZ Cybercrime Joint Management Group and the National Cyber Strategy Committee to facilitate the development of a new National Plan to Combat Cybercrime.

The Department also gained insights on international approaches through the Ottawa 5 Conference hosted by Australia and separate engagement with the United Kingdom’s Government Communications Headquarters and the European Cybercrime Centre.

The Department is working to develop and undertake a national cyber capability stocktake which will provide an important evidence base for the National Plan by identifying both gaps and centres of excellence. The building blocks for the National Plan will be established through the 2020 Cyber Security Strategy and the strong consultation process, including feedback provided by industry, academia and the community.

MEASURE 1.1.6

Counter-terrorism strategies, legislation and programs enhance our capacity to detect, prevent and respond to potential terror threats.

PERFORMANCE METRIC

RESULTS

1.1.6.1: The Department implements Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy through policy, legislative reforms and programs that respond to evolving risks and the needs of law enforcement *

This metric was met.

In 2019–20, the Department progressed a number of policy and legislative initiatives to respond to evolving counter-terrorism risks and the needs of law enforcement. This included leading implementation of Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy and ensuring continuous evaluation of its strategic priorities.

Examples of the Department’s policy and legislative initiatives in 2019–20:

• The Department continues to work with the Attorney-General’s Department and partner agencies to develop legislation to introduce an Extended Supervision Orders scheme as a less restrictive alternative to Continuing Detention Orders that may be applied for in respect of high risk terrorist offenders at the end of their sentence. The proposed scheme will amend Div 105A of the Commonwealth Criminal Code. Work is being undertaken in parallel to develop a framework to guide implementation across state and territory jurisdictions.
• The Counter-Terrorism (Temporary Exclusion Orders) Act 2019 (TEO Act) received Royal Assent in July 2019. The Temporary Exclusion Order (TEO) scheme is now operational and the first TEO was made in October 2019.
• The Australian Citizenship Amendment (Citizenship Cessation) Bill 2019 was introduced to the Parliament in September 2019. The Bill replaces the current operation of law provisions with a Ministerial decision-making model. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) was due to report on the Bill in December 2019, but did not release its report and the Bill remains before the PJCIS.

The Department’s operational implementation of counter-terrorism programs during the year resulted in consideration being given to Continuing Detention Orders in relation to eligible terrorist offenders and enhanced information sharing amongst Commonwealth agencies on Foreign Terrorist Fighters and their family members. During 2019–20, the Minister for Home Affairs notified, or attempted to notify, 15 individuals of their citizenship loss and made five Temporary Exclusion Orders to enable agencies to understand the terrorism risk posed by Australian citizens offshore.

1.1.6.2: Improve domestic and international coordination and interoperability through regular collaboration with states and territories and through convening of cross-jurisdictional and international fora ^

This metric was met.

In 2019–20, the Department led counter-terrorism governance structures, including the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC). Throughout 2019–20, the ANZCTC held all four scheduled meetings. The Committee has agreed to updates to Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy which are on schedule to be considered by National Federation Reform Council in late 2020.

The Committee also agreed to a Counter-Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (C-RPAS) solution, commencement of the ANZCTC triennial review, and the development of a training policy that allows for more flexible delivery and identifies baseline standards. In March 2020, face-to-face ANZCTC activities were postponed or cancelled in response to COVID-19. However, to ensure continuity of business, critical forums continued via video conferencing.

During 2019–20, the Department continued to work closely with our partners to improve international coordination and interoperability in relation to counter-terrorism.

Examples of the Department’s key activities in 2019–20:

• The Department co-hosted with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) a large delegation of Indonesian officials from the Counter-Terrorism Coordinating Agency and other officials from counter-terrorism agencies. The delegation studied Australia’s approaches to coordinating counter-terrorism policy, program and operational activities.
• The Department identified an opportunity to support prosecutors and courts in Indonesia to purchase and operationalise audio-visual equipment to conduct online terrorism trials during COVID-19 (and future major disruptions). The Department also worked with other Australian agencies to advise the Indonesian corrections authority on management of parolees released during COVID-19.
• The Department delivered capacity building efforts in the Philippines, including providing technical assistance to support Philippine interlocutors to draft new anti-terrorism legislation. The improved anti-terrorism legislation was passed by the Philippine Congress in June 2020.
• The Department worked with the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign Office and Metropolitan Police, and Australian posts in Southeast Asia, to map future collaboration between Australia and the UK to improve the capability of regional partner governments to detect and manage foreign terrorist fighter flows. The Department and DFAT agreed that DFAT would lead this project, noting alignment with other similar donor coordination efforts being led by DFAT.

1.1.6.3: Terrorism response and recovery arrangements are coordinated across portfolios and jurisdictions and timely advice informs Government and Ministers of events and response options *

This metric was met.

In 2019–20, the Department continued to coordinate Australia’s strategic, policy and operational approach to counter-terrorism activities. Ministers continued to be provided timely reporting on terrorism incidents, including through Hot Issues Briefs and situation reports.

The Department coordinated and chaired cross-portfolio and cross-jurisdictional forums to govern the national counter-terrorism effort and ensure whole-of-government capability and perspective was brought into effect.

Advice from these forums informed the Government and Minister in relation to policy, capability, operational approaches to countering terrorism, and on pathways for managing complex individual terrorism cases. For example:

• The Joint Operations Group enabled cross-portfolio arrangements to be put in place to best manage the risk of Australians of terrorism interest offshore.
• The Terrorist Offender Review Committee enabled the Commonwealth and states and territories to coordinate on strategic aspects of post-sentence management of offenders under the Commonwealth’s High Risk Terrorist Offenders scheme

1.1.6.4: An annual program of exercises, procurement and training is delivered, and builds counter-terrorism capability across Australia *

This metric was partially met.

In 2019–20, the Department delivered two of four scheduled ANZCTC Tiered Exercises, namely Exercise Southern Magpie (VIC) and Exercise Kraken Phase 1 (QLD).

The Department also supported the delivery of 28 of 44 scheduled ANZCTC skills enhancement training courses which focused on capability development and skills enhancement of ANZCTC’s Counter-Terrorism Capabilities. Courses included: intelligence, investigations, bomb scene examination, bomb response, police tactical group, surveillance, police technical unit, forensic support, dignitary protection, command, covert online, exercise management and crowded places.

COVID-19 limited the delivery of planned counter-terrorism exercises and training during Quarter 3 and Quarter 4 of 2019–20. The inability of stakeholders to travel resulted in the postponement of two ANZCTC Tiered Exercises, one in both New South Wales and Queensland, and the cancellation of all scheduled ANZCTC training. Video and teleconferences have enabled business continuity with the completion of several capability governance meetings.

Eight complex equipment procurement contracts and two funding agreements have been executed to address ANZCTC bring-forward projects. These projects remain partially completed, pending delivery and training to be finalised in 2020–21 financial year.

In a process coordinated by the Department, all but one jurisdiction has successfully applied to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) and the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) for permission to use novel drone detection technology. The Department, in conjunction with ACMA, CASA, and states and territories, has developed the inaugural ANZCTC C-RPAS Procedures Manual which provides operational guidance on the deployment and use of C-RPAS equipment in accordance with the Radiocommunications Act 1992 and Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998. Under both pieces of legislation, possession and activation of C-RPAS equipment, including by law enforcement agencies, is prohibited, unless authorised under an Instrument of Delegation or Exemption. The Department has developed an approach through which law enforcement agencies may seek an Instrument of Exemption or an Instrument of Delegation to enable lawful C-RPAS operations. Instruments are granted on the provision agencies agree to comply with the requirements and conditions set out in the ANZCTC C-RPAS Procedures Manual.

MEASURE 1.2.1

Effective emergency management capability and programs enhances Australia’s ability to reduce the impact of threats on Australian Communities.

PERFORMANCE METRIC

RESULTS

1.2.1.1: 100 per cent of designated special events have a security risk plan in place *

This metric was met.

In 2019–20, 100 per cent of security risk plans were in place for designated special events.

The T20 Women’s World Cup Tournament was the only declared Special Event delivered in Australia in the 2019–20 financial year. Comprehensive security arrangements were implemented at the event by the event owner, the host city police and Australian Government agencies. The event was delivered without a significant security incident.

The 2020 Anzac Day services in France and Turkey were cancelled due to the impact of COVID-19. Security planning for these events was not required.

This is a decrease in declared Special Events when compared to 2018–19, in which the Department delivered this role for the Invictus Games 2018, in Sydney, and provided security support to the Department of Veterans Affairs for the 2019 Anzac Day Commemorations in France and Turkey.

The Department’s ongoing commitment in assessing national security risks and coordinating national security support to declared Special Events contributes to the mitigation of security risks at these events, to as low as reasonably possible, in the unique circumstances of each event.

1.2.1.2: 100 per cent of high office holders have appropriate physical risk mitigations in place *

This metric was met.

In 2019–20, 100 per cent of designated high office holders² and locations had physical security risk mitigation plans in place. There was a total number of 50 high office holders and 20 locations with appropriate physical security risk mitigations in place.

All eligible high office holders and locations had security risk mitigations in place during 2018–19. There were no significant changes to the total number of high office holders during this time. However, the formation of the First Morrison Ministry in August 2018 and the Second Morrison Ministry in May 2019 following the Federal Election, generated significant workloads for the Department. All newly eligible high office holders were assessed and subsequent mitigation implemented in the months following the Federal Election.

The Department’s ongoing commitment in assessing security risks associated with high office holders contributes to their ongoing safety and that of their staff at residences and workplaces.

1.2.1.3: Eligible disaster assistance requests are approved within six hours of an agreed request received #

This metric was met.

In 2019–20, the Department received 75 requests for domestic disaster assistance under the Australian Government Disaster Response Plan, an increase in requests of 500 per cent in comparison to the 15 requests received during 2018–19. 100 per cent of requests in 2019–20 were approved within hours of receipt, in comparison to 93 per cent during 2018–19. The increase in requests experienced during 2019–20 was due to the severity of the 2019–20 bushfires and demonstrates the ongoing commitment of the Department to provide timely advice in the advent of a crisis.

1.2.1.4: The Government receives advice within 48 hours of completing an assessment of Commonwealth only Disaster Recovery Payments #

This metric was met.

In 2019–20, the Australian Government Disaster Recovery Payment (AGDRP) and Disaster Recovery Allowance (DRA) was activated in response to eight bushfire events across the ACT, NSW, Victoria, Tasmania, SA and Queensland.

The Department advised the Australian Government within 48 hours of completing an assessment and verifying impact data in 100 per cent of cases.

This is an increase of five compared to 2018–19, where only three activations of AGDRP and DRA were recorded.

Over $248 million in AGDRP and DRA has been made available to impacted individuals and families, compared to $121.80 million for the same period in 2018–19.

The increase in financial assistance was due to the severity of the 2019–20 bushfires and demonstrates the effectiveness of the Department in providing timely advice to Government during a crises to support vulnerable members of the community. The immediate relief for individuals provided by the AGDRP and the support to employees, small business persons and farmers provided by the DRA contributed to enhanced community resilience and recovery.

1.2.1.5: Advice on activation of Category C and Category D measures is provided to the Government within 72 hours of receipt of an accepted application from a state or territory government #

This metric was not met.

In 2019–20, the Department assessed a total of seven Category C³ and Category D⁴ requests for 6 events. This is a decrease from the 12 Category C and D requests received for three events in 2018–19.⁵

The Department has continued to meet the required standard in providing advice to Government for unfolding events with three out of seven assessments being provided within 72 hours of receipt of an accepted application. The remaining four were related to legacy events and required protracted and complex engagement with the affected states. Assessment of these requests took longer than the 72 hours.

1.2.1.6: Demonstrated progress against key initiatives within the National Disaster Risk Reduction Framework *

This metric was met.

In 2019–20, the Department progressed foundational outcomes to support the implementation of the National Disaster Risk Reduction Framework (the Framework). A central premise of the Framework and the associated National Action Plan is the coordinated action across sectors to understand and address systemic disaster risk. The Department’s efforts are directed toward coordination and collective action.

In May 2020, Emergency Management Ministers endorsed the first National Action Plan to implement the Framework. The Department will continue to liaise with relevant Ministers and stakeholders to finalise the National Action Plan.

In June 2020, a pilot project in the supply chain and freight sector was finalised. The pilot project explored the feasibility and benefits of a national disaster risk information and services capability. This pilot is a key Government contribution to implement the Framework, delivering on its first priority 'understand disaster risk' and enabling progress on the Framework's three other priorities.

In June 2020, state and territory implementation plans for the National Partnership Agreement (NPA) on Disaster Risk Reduction were approved by the Hon David Littleproud MP. Payment of 2019–20 NPA funds have been, or will shortly be made, enabling states and territories to commence their disaster risk reduction programs and activities.